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CAN BIG BROTHER WATCH YOU? THE IMPLICATIONS
OF THE DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY'S
PROPOSED NATIONAL APPLICATIONS OFFICE FOR
FOURTH AMENDMENT PROTECTIONS
MELISSA DEAL*
T HE DEPARTMENT of Homeland Security plans on launch-ing a National Applications Office and assigning it the task
of disseminating spy satellite data to federal and local law en-
forcement agencies.1 The distribution of this information to law
enforcement agencies raises Fourth Amendment privacy con-
cerns that the Department of Homeland Security will have to
address.2 Part I of this paper discusses the Department of
Homeland Security's proposals for the National Applications
Office and several of the constitutional problems that it poses.
Part II details the history of Fourth Amendment protections as
they apply to law enforcement surveillance without trespass.
Part III gives an exposition of four pertinent Supreme Court
cases and a recent circuit court case. Part IV analyzes the cur-
rent case law regarding the Fourth Amendment privacy protec-
tions and how it will impact the use of spy satellite
reconnaissance in the hands of law enforcement officials.
I. THE NATIONAL APPLICATIONS OFFICE
For years, the federal government has allowed civilians limited
use of spy satellite data through the Civil Applications Commit-
* J.D. Candidate, Southern Methodist University Dedman School of Law,
2009; B.S., Duke University, 2005. The author would like to thank her parents,
John and Elizabeth Deal, for their love and support.
I K.C. Jones, Domestic Spy Satellite Program Put On Hold: Privacy Concerns Arise
Over a DHS Plan to Expand the Use of Satellites to Help National Security and Law
Enforcement Officials Combat Crime, INFORMATION WK., Oct. 2, 2007, available at
http://www.informationweek.com/shared/printableArticleSrc.;html?articleID=
202200257.
2 See U.S. Postpones Domestic Spy Satellite Program, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 2, 2007, at A21.
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tee.' Such uses have been limited to environmental and
scientific purposes such as monitoring volcanic activity, environ-
mental and geographic change, and hurricanes and floods.4 Af-
ter 9/11, a study group was formed in order to research a
possible expansion of the Civil Applications Committee in a
push for better communication between the military, the intelli-
gence community, and the police.5 As a result of these studies,
the Department of Homeland Security has decided to launch a
new branch called the National Applications Office.6 This office
will expand the use of classified satellite reconnaissance for
homeland security and law enforcement purposes. The Depart-
ment of Homeland Security claims authority for this new branch
under Executive Order 12333' and the Privacy Act of 1974.8
The Department of Homeland Security claims that there will
be no civil liberty infringements because the National Applica-
tions Office will be subject to "oversight by the DHS Inspector
General, Chief Privacy Officer, and the Officer for Civil Right
and Civil Liberties."9 Despite these assurances, the formation of
the National Applications Office raises questions about potential
violations of the Fourth Amendment protections against unlaw-
ful searches and seizures.
Although the Court has allowed warrantless searches by law
enforcement aircraft,10 this program allows local law enforce-
ment officials to gain access to information that would otherwise
require a probable cause showing under the Fourth
Amendment.
The development of the National Applications Office brings
to the forefront an important conflict between civil liberties and
national security.
3 Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Homeland Sec., Fact Sheet: National Applica-





7 Exec. Order No. 12,333, 46 Fed. Reg. 59,941 (Dec. 4, 1981), available at 1981
WL 76054.
8 5 U.S.C. § 552b (1974); Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Homeland Sec., supra
note 3.
9 Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Homeland Sec., supra note 3.
10 See Florida v. Riley, 488 U.S. 445, 451-52 (1989); Dow Chem. Co. v. United
States, 476 U.S. 227, 239 (1986); California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 215 (1986).
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A. THREE PROPOSED DOMAINS OF THE NATIONAL
APPLICATIONS OFFICE
The plan for the National Applications Office includes three
working domains: the civil applications domain, the homeland
security domain, and the law enforcement domain. 1 The civil
applications domain will likely track the duties of the Civil Appli-
cations Committee, which is currently in place. 2 The homeland
security domain will direct the use of satellite imagery when
dealing with threats to national security such as terrorism and
natural or man-made disasters. ' It is the third domain-the law
enforcement domain-that raises the most privacy concerns. It
is this domain that will cooperate with local and state law en-
forcement and allow these civilian agencies access to satellite
reconnaissance.14
B. POTENTIAL USES AND MISUSES
One of the purposes of the National Applications Office is to
expand the civilian use of spy network data beyond environmen-
tal and scientific applications.'5 The Department of Homeland
Security hopes to develop the use of satellite data in the areas of
border control, natural disaster response, and local and federal
law enforcement. 6
Spy satellite capabilities are much greater than current civil-
ian satellite capabilities. Intelligence community capabilities in-
clude being able to view "real-time, high-resolution images and
data.""7 The National Applications Office would make available
to law enforcement officials the technological capability to "see
through cloud cover, forest canopies and even concrete" as well
as the ability to track human movement.' Such satellite data
can be used to detect methamphetamine labs and marijuana
cultivation.' 9 It is even capable of detecting trampled vegetation




15 Robert Block, U.S. to Expand Domestic Use of Spy Satellites, WALL ST.J., Aug. 15,





19 John Rendleman, Spy Satellite Deal Gets Hill Riled Up: DHS Wants to Share Data
with Local Agencies, GOV'T COMPUTER NEWS, Sept. 17, 2007, at 5, available at http:/
/gcn.com/print/26_24/45023-1.html.
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indicating illegal border crossings and can locate tunnels used
for trafficking people and drugs.20
C. CLAIMED OVERSIGHT
The Office of Homeland Security claims that the National Ap-
plications Office will have proper oversight to ensure that the
dissemination of spy satellite information is legal and does not
encroach on civil liberties.21 The Department of Homeland Se-
curity Inspector General, Chief Privacy Officer, and the Officer
for Civil Rights and Civil Liberties will have oversight duties
since the office is part of the DHS.22 These offices intend to
implement procedural safeguards to ensure that requests for sat-
ellite data do not infringe upon "privacy and civil liberties. 23
One example of such procedural safeguards includes requiring
a Proper Use Memorandum ("PUM") be completed prior to the
dissemination of spy satellite information. 24 The PUM demands
that the requesting agency disclose its reasons for needing the
information, its intended use, who will receive the information,
where it plans on storing the information, and a "certification by
an appropriate official of the lawfulness and validity of the re-
quest. '25 Once the National Applications Office processes the
requests, it will send the requests to the National Geospatial-In-
telligence Agency, who will order the "military satellites opera-
tors to gather the data specified in the requests. "26
While these oversights seem comforting at first glance, the De-
partment of Homeland Security has overstepped its boundaries
on at least four previous occasions.27 Furthermore, as this arti-
cle discusses, the proper legal standards for the use of this type
of intelligence are unclear, which makes the oversight illusory.
The absence of a written legal structure for the National Appli-
cations Office has led politicians to demand a delay of the of-
fice's launch.28 The extensive capabilities of spy satellites are
20 Id.
21 Turning Spy Satellites on the Homeland: The Privacy and Civil Liberties Implications
of the National Applications Office Before the H. Comm. on Homeland Security, 110th
Cong. 5-8 (2007) [hereinafter Hearings] (statement of Daniel W. Sutherland, Of-
ficer for Civil Rights and Civil Liberties, U.S. Dep't of Homeland Sec.).
22 Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Homeland Sec., supra note 3.
23 See id.
24 Hearings, supra note 21, at 6-7.
25 Id. at 7.
26 Rendleman, supra note 19, at 5.




classified and, as a result, not fully known by the public.29 In
fact, conflicting reports about the ability of these satellites3"
make it difficult to assess the legal boundaries that need to be
erected around them.
II. HISTORY OF FOURTH AMENDMENT
The Fourth Amendment protects U.S. citizens from unreason-
able searches by government actors31 by providing that:
[t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures,
shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon prob-
able cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly
describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to
be seized.32
The threshold issue is whether or not a search has taken
place. 3 When there is a "search" within the meaning of the
Fourth Amendment, there is "a presumption that a warrant is
required."34 A warrant must be supported by probable cause,
which generally means that the search is likely to turn up in-
criminating evidence. 5
To establish whether or not a search has taken place, the two
requirements laid out in Katz v. United States must be met.36
First, the defendant must have had a "(subjective) expectation
of privacy."37 And second, this expectation of privacy must be
one that society is willing to protect.3 8 So, underlying this two-
29 Stew Magnuson & Breanne Wagner, Physical, Privacy Limits of Domestic Spy
Satellites Questioned, NAT'L DEFENSE, Nov. 2007, available at http://
www.nationaldefensemagazine.org/issues/2007/November/SecBeat.htm.
30 Id.
31 Reginald Short, Comment, The Kyllo Conundrum: A New Standard to Address
Technology that Represents a Step Backward for the Fourth Amendment Protections, 80
DENV. U. L. REv. 463, 472 (2002).
32 U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
33 See Dow Chem. Co. v. United States, 476 U.S. 227, 234 (1986).
34 United States v. Garcia, 474 F.3d 994, 996 (7th Cir. 2007).
35 Id.
36 Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (HarlanJ., concurring).
37 Id.
38 Id. It is important to note that the pertinent question for the second prong
of the Katz requirements is "whether the government's intrusion infringes upon
the personal and societal values protected by the Fourth Amendment" as op-
posed to whether or not the action was "private." Oliver v. United States, 466
U.S. 170, 182-83 (1984).
2008]
JOURNAL OF AIR LAW AND COMMERCE
prong test is anything that is "knowingly exposed" is not pro-
tected by the Fourth Amendment. 9
A. EARLY HISTORY OF THE FOURTH AMENDMENT
The principle that every man's house is his castle was estab-
lished in Semayne's Case in 1604.40 It was upon this principle that
the Fourth Amendment took root.4 In fact, the first cases inter-
preting the Fourth Amendment used a very narrow reading of
the clause, so any search conducted without a warrant was inher-
ently unreasonable.4 2 The amendment lends itself to two possi-
ble interpretations-a search is unreasonable if conducted
without a warrant, or a search without a warrant is constitutional
only if it is reasonable. Thus, it is not surprising, in light of the
fact that the amendment was passed to protect citizens from
such abuses as took place in the early American colonies with
respect to writs of assistance, that the Court chose the conserva-
tive interpretation most limiting to the government. This inter-
pretation was eventually displaced by the latter reading, which
permits warrantless searches if they are reasonable. 4' This inter-
pretation made its first appearance in United States v. Rabinowitz'44
and has been further elaborated upon since that time.45
Until the early twentieth century, the Court based its Fourth
Amendment decisions on a "property-based rationale. 46 Dur-
ing this time, the Fourth Amendment was only invoked when
there was a physical invasion upon another person's property.47
Under this rationale, searches similar to those discussed in this
article-wiretapping, video surveillance, the use of thermal
imaging devices, binoculars, telescopes, and beepers-would
not be considered "searches" at all, since they do not involve a
law enforcement officer's intrusion upon the property of a civil-
ian. This "property-based rationale" was overturned by the
Court in Katz v. United States.48 In this case, the Court essentially
39 Katz, 389 U.S. at 351.
40 Semayne's Case, (1604) 77 Eng. Rep. 194, 194 (K.B.) ("That the house of
everyone is to him as his castle.").
41 Short, supra note 31, at 464 n.6.
42 Id. at 465.
43 Id.
44 339 U.S. 56 (1950).
45 Short, supra note 31, at 465-66.
46 Id. at 466.
47 Id.
48 Id. at 467; Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967).
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overruled its prior decision in Olmstead v. United States,49 and in-
stead held that the Fourth Amendment "protects people, not
places. ' 50 In fact, the current two-prong test comes from Justice
Harlan's concurrence in the Katz case.51
Although the court expanded the meaning of the Fourth
Amendment to include intrusions on privacy, this interpretation
has been subsequently narrowed. One example of such narrow-
ing is the effect the "open fields" doctrine has on the curtilage
doctrine.52 The curtilage doctrine protects a person's expecta-
tion of privacy within his home.53 But the "open fields" doctrine
curtailed the curtilage doctrine by distinguishing between a
home and "open areas beyond the curtilage. ''54 Areas not "im-
mediately surrounding the home" are fair game for government
intrusion. 55 Using the "open fields" doctrine, the Court has jus-
tified warrantless searches made from helicopters and
airplanes.56
The Katz test expounded by Justice Harlan evaluates the con-
stitutionality of a search based on an individual's "reasonable
expectation of privacy. '57 Using this test, the court has further
chipped away at the protections provided by the Fourth Amend-
49 277 U.S. 438 (1928).
50 Katz, 389 U.S. at 361; Short, supra note 31, at 467. The Court had previously
held in Olmstead v. United States that in order to invoke the operation of Fourth
Amendment protections there has to have been "an official search and seizure of
his person or such a seizure of his papers or his tangible material effects or an
actual physical invasion of his house." Olmstead, 277 U.S. at 466.
51 Katz, 389 U.S. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring).
[T] here is a twofold requirement, first that a person have exhibited
an actual (subjective) expectation of privacy and, second, that the
expectation be one that society is prepared to recognize as 'reason-
able.' Thus a man's home is, for most purposes, a place where he
expects privacy, but objects, activities, or statements that he exposes
to the 'plain view' of outsiders are not 'protected' because no inten-
tion to keep them to himself has been exhibited. On the other
hand, conversations in the open would not be protected against
being overheard, for the expectation of privacy under the circum-
stances would be unreasonable.
Id.
52 Dow Chem. Co. v. United States, 476 U.S. 227, 235 (1986).
53 Id.
54 Id. at 235-36.
55 Id. at 236.
56 Florida v. Riley, 488 U.S. 445, 451-52 (1989); Dow, 476 U.S. at 239; Califor-
nia v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 215 (1986).
57 Sara A. Chandler, Collateral Damage? The Impact of National Security Crises on
the Fourth Amendment Protection Against Unreasonable Searches, 68 U. Prr. L. REv.
217, 229-30 (2006).
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ment.58 For example, although the Court held that a person has
a reasonable expectation of privacy during telephone conversa-
tions,59 the Court has found that a person has no reasonable
expectation of privacy in cars,60 in online chat-rooms, 61 or re-
garding information provided to banks.6 2 One commentator
pointed out that citizens' expectations of privacy are likely to be
diminished as technology advances. So, the reduction in the ex-
pectation of privacy will result in more legal surveillance, such as
cameras mounted on stop lights and video cameras placed in
convenience stores and banks.63 The lower peoples' expecta-
tions of privacy are, the smaller their constitutional protections
become.
While the "reasonable expectation" standard has shaped the
jurisprudence surrounding privacy rights since Katz, the Court
in Kyllo v. United States limited its application by holding that law
enforcement officials may not employ surveillance devices not
used by the general public.64 This is the major limit on the "rea-
sonable expectation" standard. Without the Court's decision in
Kyllo, it appeared that the advancement of technology might de-
crease the Fourth Amendment's application and send it into ob-
livion. Instead, law enforcement agencies are no longer given
free reign to intrude further into the privacy of peoples' homes
as technology continues to advance and peoples' expectations of
privacy decrease. The question remains as to what extent the
executive branch, through agencies such as the Department of
Homeland Security, will honor these protections of privacy.
III. RECENT CASES INVOLVING AERIAL SURVEILLANCE
AND OTHER TECHNOLOGICAL ADVANCES
Three recent decisions from the Supreme Court shed light on
the analysis of what safeguards are necessary to ensure the pro-
tection of U.S. citizens from unreasonable searches and seizures
by federal and local law enforcement agencies when these agen-
cies are given access to spy satellite data collection capabilities.
Two of these cases-California v. Ciraolo and Dow Chemical Co. v.
58 Id. at 230.
59 See Shaun B. Spencer, Reasonable Expectations and the Erosion of Privacy, 29 SAN
DIEGO L. REv. 843, 847 (2002).
60 Chandler, supra note 57, at 231.
61 United States v. Charbonneau, 979 F. Supp. 1177, 1185 (S.D. Ohio 1997).
62 United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 437 (1976).
63 Short, supra note 31, at 472-73.
64 Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 40 (2001).
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United States-seem to point in the opposite direction of the
third, more recent case: Kyllo v. United States. First, this paper
will discuss the basic details of these cases. Then it will analyze
the possible arguments regarding the necessity of privacy protec-
tions with respect to executive branch agencies such as the Na-
tional Applications Office.
A. MAJORITY AND PLURALITY OPINIONS
In California v. Ciraolo, the Court dealt with a case in which law
enforcement officials, after receiving a tip, procured a private
plane, flew over the defendant's home, and took pictures of the
defendant's backyard in which he was growing marijuana.65 The
cultivation of marijuana could not be observed except from an
aerial view because the defendant had erected two fences (one
that was six feet high and one that was ten feet high) around the
premises.66 The Court held that the defendant's Fourth
Amendment rights were not violated by this surveillance of his
curtilage, 6' because his backyard was visible to anyone traveling
at such an altitude.68 The Court found it important that the
plane was traveling at an altitude that was within navigable air-
space and that the marijuana plants could be seen from that
altitude with the naked eye. 69 Since the defendant had know-
ingly exposed his backyard and therefore, his backyard's vegeta-
tion, to observation from navigable airspace, he did not have a
reasonable expectation of privacy.7" The Court refused to ad-
dress the constitutionality of the photograph itself as an exhibit,
since "[i]t was the officer's observation, not the photograph,
that supported the warrant."'" The Court determined that just
because the area observed is within the curtilage, it is not neces-
sarily a violation of a person's Fourth Amendment rights for a
government actor to observe this area.72
65 California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 209 (1986).
66 Id.
67 Id. at 213-14. The Court, in Ciraolo, defines curtilage as "the area to which
extends the intimate activity associated with the 'sanctity of a man's home and
the privacies of life."' Id. (quoting Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 180
(1984)).
- Id. at 215.
69 Id. at 209, 215.
70 Id. at 213.
71 Id. at 212 n.1.
72 Id. at 213.
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The Supreme Court decided a similar case on the same day as
Ciraolo: Dow Chemical Co. v. United States.73 In Dow, the Court
held that the aerial photographing of a chemical plant was not a
prohibited search within the meaning of the Fourth Amend-
ment, and therefore the government, namely the Environmen-
tal Protection Agency ("EPA"), did not encroach on Dow's right
to privacy.74 The Court discussed whether the area observed was
within the facility's curtilage, and if the "open fields" doctrine
applied.75 The Court determined that the area between the
buildings had elements of both curtilage and "open fields," but
also lacked important elements of each.76 In reaching its final
holding, the Court put great emphasis on the facts that the pho-
tograph was taken with a camera that could be used by the gen-
eral public in mapmaking 77 and the EPA's plane was flying
within navigable airspace when the photographs were taken.7 8
The Court also emphasized that, although the camera could dis-
tinguish wires that were half an inch in diameter, it could not
"penetrate the walls of buildings and record conversations in
Dow's plants. ' 79 In dicta the Court went on to say that "satellite
technology" might raise "constitutional concerns" because of
the possibility of it revealing "intimate details."80 In a footnote,
the majority defined "intimate detail" as being able to make out
human faces or read documents.8 ' Yet again, the Court in Dow
refused to err on the side of caution with respect to preserving
the constitutional right of privacy.
The Supreme Court's most recent case dealing with aerial sur-
veillance of private property came in 1989.2 In Florida v. Riley,
the Court held to its previous line of reasoning regarding the
right to privacy in one's own backyard: essentially, there is
none. 3 The plurality in Riley further defined what "reasonable
expectations" are with respect to overhead surveillance. The law
71 Id. at 215 n.3; Dow Chem. Co. v. United States, 476 U.S. 227 (1986).
74 Dow, 476 U.S. at 239.
75 Id. at 235.
76 Id. at 236.
77 Id. at 238.
78 Id. at 237.
79 Id. at 238.
80 Id.
81 Id. at 238 n.5 ("[N]or are there any identifiable human faces or secret docu-
ments captured in such a fashion as to implicate more serious privacy
concerns.").
82 Florida v. Riley, 488 U.S. 445 (1989).
83 Id. at 445.
416
2008] NATIONAL APPLICATIONS OFFICE 417
enforcement agents in Riley used a helicopter to observe the
contents of the defendant's greenhouse.84 Again, the Court
found that the greenhouse, being between ten and twenty feet
behind the house, was part of defendant's "curtilage. ''85 While it
is not surprising that the Court found that privacy within one's
curtilage is not protected from observation, it is remarkable that
the subject matter being observed not only had two walls, but
also was housed underneath a roof.86 And, the investigating of-
ficer was only able to observe the marijuana growing within the
greenhouse because two panels of the greenhouse's roof were
missing." The Court, on its own volition, even pointed out that
ninety percent of the roof still remained.88 It seems, therefore,
that even the slightest aperture that allows observation from
above dispenses all Fourth Amendment privacy protections with
respect to materials exposed by the opening. The plurality rea-
soned that since the helicopter was within navigable airspace,
the observations of the investigating officer were made from a
"public vantage point. '89 And the plurality opinion recognized
that although the defendant expected that his "crops" were not
observable, this expectation was unreasonable. 90 Apparently, it
is unreasonable to expect a roof to provide privacy from aerial
observation. In fact, the court goes to great lengths tojustify the
aerial observance by explaining that, per Federal Aviation Ad-
ministration ("FAA") regulations, helicopters can fly at an alti-
tude as low as 500 feet.9" The Court even suggests that its
holding might have been different if the helicopter had not
been flying within navigable airspace.92
The plurality opinion also lays out three other factors that it
considered decisive to the invocation of Fourth Amendment
protection. 93 The questioned observation must be sufficiently
rare, the observation must interfere with the normal use of the
curtilage, or the observation must detect intimate details.94 It is
important to point out that the case was a plurality opinion with
84 Id. at 448.
85 Id. at 450.
86 Id. at 448.
87 Id.
88 Id.
89 Id. at 449-50.
90 Id. at 450.
91 Id. at 451 n.3.
92 Id. at 451-52.
93 Id. at 452.
94 Id.
JOURNAL OF AIR LAW AND COMMERCE
Justice O'Connor concurring in the judgment. 5  Justice
O'Connor's concurring opinion, while agreeing that the defen-
dant did not have a reasonable right to privacy within his green-
house, pointed out that the determinative factor was not that
the helicopter was in airspace in which the FAA permitted it to
travel, but rather the fact that the public frequently travels at
such an altitude.9 6 Since the public generally travels at such an
altitude, observation from such a height is what citizens must
reasonably expect.97
The Supreme Court changed course when it decided Kyllo v.
United States twelve years later." In Kyllo, the Court found that
the surveillance of a home using a thermal-imaging device was a
search within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment and
therefore, was an unconstitutional intrusion on the citizen's
right to privacy. 9 The Court distinguishes this case from previ-
ous cases involving aerial surveillance because, in Kyllo, the law
enforcement officials were observing things inside the house
rather than outside."° The Court reiterated the "firm line" that
it had previously drawn around the home. 101 The Court dis-
cussed the intimate details that could be obtained by observing a
home using such heat-detecting technology as applied in this
case. 102
Up to this point, the Supreme Court had held that observa-
tion of a person's home by law enforcement officials did not
violate Fourth Amendment protections. 10 3 The Court distin-
guished this case from prior case law by pointing out that this
observation involved technology that is not available to the gen-
eral public.10 4 Therefore, the information gained from using a
95 Id. at 446.
96 Id. at 455 ("If the public rarely, if ever, travels overhead at such altitudes, the
observation cannot be said to be from a vantage point generally used by the pub-
lic and Riley cannot be said to have 'knowingly expose[d]' his greenhouse to
public view.").
97 Id.
98 Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 33-34 (2001).
9 Id. at 40.
100 Id. at 37-38.
101 Id. at 40 ("We have said that the Fourth Amendment draws 'a firm line at
the entrance to the house."' (quoting Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 590
(1980))).
102 Id. at 38.
103 Id. at 31-32.
104 Id. at 34.
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thermal-imaging device is not the type of information that a
passerby would be able to obtain. 1°5
Although the Court spent a great deal of time in Kyllo discuss-
ing the importance of protecting the Fourth Amendment pri-
vacy guarantees from erosion, it did admit that its holdings in
Ciraolo and Dow were examples of such "erosion."106 The dis-
turbing part of this concession is that the Court seems to wave its
hand at these two cases as merely being a by-product of the inev-
itable fact that the right to privacy will be curtailed by ever-devel-
oping technology. 107 The Court distinguished Ciraolo and Dow
from Kyllo on two distinct bases. Ciraolo, it contended, was dif-
ferent because the portions of the home surveyed in that case
were uncovered, and thus available to public view from above.108
Although the Fourth Amendment would originally have pro-
tected the privacy of this enclosed area of curtilage, advances in
science-such as those made by the Wright brothers-have ex-
posed open areas of the home to observation from above that
have eliminated this portion of a person's right to privacy.109
The Court distinguished Dow from Kyllo based upon the fact that
the area observed in Dow was not "adjacent to a private
home."'110 The Court could not distinguish Dow from Kyllo the
same way it distinguished Ciraolo from Kyllo presumably because
the observation involved in Dow used technology that made
things viewable that were otherwise unobservable with human
eyes.11 ' The law enforcement officials in Dow used a special
camera that magnified the image being captured.1 1 2 In sum-
mary, the government is allowed to view areas adjacent to a pri-
vate home as well as areas that are not adjacent to a private
home, as long as the areas adjacent to a private home are ob-
served using technology that does not magnify the view. 1
B. DISSENTS FROM AERIAL SURVEILLANCE CASES
The dissenting opinions in the three surveillance, Supreme
Court cases are important to an analysis of the current law, espe-
105 Id. at 33-34.
106 Id.
107 Id.
108 Id. at 34.
-o Id. at 33-34.
"o Id. at 33.
III Id. at 33-34.
112 Dow Chem. Co. v. United States, 476 U.S. 227, 230 (1986).
113 Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 33-35, 40.
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cially in light of the fact that each of the cases were such close
votes.1 14 In addition, the dissents shed light on gaps that the
majority-and in the case of Riley, the plurality-left open to
interpretation, especially when trying to determine to what ex-
tent specific technology can be used by the government.
In Dow, Justice Powell pointed out that the majority fails to
apply the Katz test despite purporting to do so." 5 He conceded
that the majority properly evaluated the first prong of the Katz
test in determining that Dow subjectively expected privacy
within its manufacturing plant.116 But Justice Powell asserted
that the majority opinion failed to properly consider the second
prong of the Katz test.1 7 Rather than focus on whether Dow's
expectation of privacy is one that society is willing to recognize,
the Court spent its time discussing the manner in which the sur-
veillance was made. 118 The dissenting opinion disagreed with
this line of reasoning."' The manner in which the surveillance
was made, Powell stated, has no bearing on whether or not the
expectation of privacy is reasonable.120 And Powell further as-
serted that this "manner of surveillance" reasoning left privacy
rights "seriously at risk" with the advancement of technology.' 2 '
Finally, even if it is true that the manner of observation relates
to the reasonableness of the expectation of privacy, the Court
misapplied the doctrine because the technology used in this
case was quite sophisticated and most likely not generally used
by the public.12 2
Justice Powell also pointed out in his dissent in Dow that the
doctrines of "open fields" and curtilage were inapplicable in this
case because the Dow manufacturing plant was, as the majority
admits, neither. 23 He stated that when something is an "open
114 California v. Ciraolo was a 5-4 decision. California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207,
208 (1986). Dow Chem. Co. v. United States was a 5-4 decision. Dow, 476 U.S. at
228. Florida v. Riley was a 4-1-4 decision. Florida v. Riley, 488 U.S. 445, 446
(1989).
115 Dow, 476 U.S. at 247 (Powell, J., dissenting in part, concurring in part).
116 Id.
117 Id.
118 Id. at 247-48.
119 Id. at 240.
120 Id. at 251.
121 Id.
122 Id. at 249-50 n.12. In fact, Justice Powell pointed out that not only are
satellite images less able to pick up minute details than the camera used in this
case, but also members of the public are not "likely to purchase $22,000 cam-
eras." Id. at 251 n.13.
123 Id. at 250.
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field" within the meaning of that doctrine, it is subject to
ground search as well as aerial search. 124 However, the manufac-
turing plant was not open to ground search by the EPA offi-
cials, 125 so the majority's use of an absence of physical trespass to
justify its holding is inapplicable. 126 This principle, according to
the dissent, has been recognized by the Court since Katz.
127
Justice Powell wrote the dissent for Ciraolo as well. 128 Powell
pointed out that until the majority's decision in Ciraolo, the cur-
tilage was considered part of the home for the purposes of de-
termining the reasonableness of privacy expectations. 129 Powell
felt the majority essentially destroyed the purpose of the curti-
lage doctrine by declaring that a person does not have a reason-
able expectation of privacy with respect to parts of the curtilage
that are knowingly exposed to public view. 130 Prior to this deci-
sion, the purpose of defining the area immediately adjacent to
the home as curtilage was to recognize the fact that people have
a reasonable expectation of privacy in this area as well as in their
homes. 13'
Powell reiterated that the manner of surveillance should not
be the factor determinative of whether such a surveillance was
an infringement on a privacy expectation. 13 2 Powell's reasoning
in Ciraolo differs from that in his dissent for Dow primarily be-
cause the equipment used in Ciraolo was widely available for pub-
lic use. 13 ' This precluded his argument that the use of this
equipment by law enforcement officials was a search because it
was not in the hands of the general public.1 34 Instead Powell
argued that even though the public travels at the same altitude
as the plane used by the investigating officer in the case, mem-
bers of the public rarely do more than "glimpse" at the fields,
homes, backyards, or other areas they are flying over.1 35 Society
doesn't expect aerial surveillance of its backyards as evidenced
by the fact that people build fences around their backyards, but
124 Id. at 250-51.
125 Id. at 251.
126 Id. at 252.
127 Id.
128 California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 215-26 (1986) (Powell, J., dissenting).
129 Id. at 219-21.
130 Id. at 222-24.
131 Id. at 221.
132 Id. at 223.
133 Id.
134 Id.
135 Id. at 223-24.
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not roofs.' 36 Powell pointed out that after the majority's deci-
sion in Ciraolo, people only have reasonable expectations of pri-
vacy when they are within their homes. 137
Powell's final point in his dissent in Ciraolo was that the
Court's decision opened the door for "silent and unseen" inva-
sions that are not subject to Fourth Amendment require-
ments. 138 This, he pointed out, was what the Court was trying to
protect the public from in Katz.'1 9 So, the Court has disposed of
more than a fragment of Fourth Amendment protections had by
U.S. citizens. 140
Justice Brennan's dissent in Riley is the most powerful of the
three dissenting opinions written about the Fourth Amendment
protections against aerial surveillance.' 41 Brennan started by
pointing out the same thing that Powell harped on in his dis-
senting opinions: the fact that the Court failed to apply the Katz
test.14 2 Brennan stated that the relevant inquiry is not whether
the helicopter from which the government was observing the
activity was allowed to be where it was, but rather whether the
person being observed had a reasonable expectation of privacy
that society is willing to protect. 4
3
The second problem that Justice Brennan has with the plural-
ity opinion is its questionable application of the following lan-
guage from the Katz opinion: "[w]hat a person knowingly
exposes to the public ... is not a subject of Fourth Amendment
protection.' 14 4 Rather than focusing on whether or not the pub-
lic is actually able to view the subject in question, the plurality is
misguided when it focuses on whether it is possible for the pub-
lic to view the subject in question.'45 Brennan suggested that
136 Id.
137 Id. at 225 n.10 ("It would appear that, after today, families can expect to be
free of official surveillance only when they retreat behind the walls of their
homes.").
138 Id. at 225-26.
139 Id. at 226.
140 Id.
141 Florida v. Riley, 488 U.S. 445, 456-67 (1989) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
142 Id. at 456-57 ("The plurality undertakes no inquiry into whether low-level
helicopter surveillance by the police of activities in an enclosed backyard is con-
sistent with the 'aims of a free and open society."').
143 Id. at 456.
-4 Id. at 457 (quoting Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967)).
145 Id. ("Under the plurality's exceedingly grudging Fourth Amendment the-
ory, the expectation of privacy is defeated if a single member of the public could




the Court should focus more on the reality of the expectation of
privacy, rather than the "theoretical possibility" of exposure. 46
The dissent shared Justice O'Connor's view that the plurality
was incorrect in focusing on whether the law enforcement heli-
copter was traveling in airspace where it was allowed to be under
FAA regulations 47 because the Fourth Amendment is wholly un-
related to FAA regulations. 141 Whether the Fourth Amendment
has been violated has never hinged upon whether the govern-
ment actor broke the law in conducting the "search.' ' 49
Justice Brennan suggests that the test to determine if the ob-
servation was a "search" should be whether the observation was
so "commonplace" as to render the defendant without an expec-
tation of privacy.15 In making this determination, Brennan
would focus on the ability of the public to make the observation
and the frequency with which the public makes such observa-
tions. 5' In this way, Brennan would change the focus from
whether the defendant had exposed himself to "possible" obser-
vation, to whether the defendant had exposed himself to "rea-
sonable" observation. 5 2 This focus, Brennan believed, would
properly redirect the Court to the purpose behind the Fourth
Amendment."'
Since the "intimate details" theory has been such a prevalent
part of the jurisprudence regarding the Fourth Amendment and
law enforcement surveillance, Justice Brennan addressed it in
his dissent." 4 He argued that it does not matter what the police
saw the defendant doing, or what the police might have seen him
doing when they observed him.'55 Brennan explains that
whether or not a "search" within the meaning of the Fourth
Amendment has been conducted "does not turn on whether the
146 Id.
147 Id. at 464-65.
148 Id. at 458-59.
149 Id. Justice Brennan points out that the Court has "consistently refused to
equate police violation of the law with infringement of the Fourth Amendment."
Id. at 459.
150 Id. at 460.
151 Id.
152 Id.
153 Id. at 462 ("The basic purpose of this Amendment, as recognized in count-
less decisions of this Court, is to safeguard the privacy and security of individuals
against arbitrary invasions by governmental officials." (quoting Camara v. Mun.
Court, 387 U.S. 523, 528 (1967))).
154 See id. at 463.
155 Id. at 463-64.
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activity disclosed by a search is illegal or innocuous,"1 56 but
rather depends upon the details of the inspection itself. 57 The
plurality, he concluded, misdirects its attention. 158
C. GPS TRACKING
A recent case decided by the Seventh Circuit sheds light on
the issue of advancing technology used by law enforcement and
its impact on privacy rights. 159 In this case, the police placed a
Global Positioning System ("GPS") tracking device on the defen-
dant's truck in order to trace its movement. 6 ° The tracking de-
vice eventually led the police to a methamphetamine lab
operated by the defendant. 6 The defendant moved to sup-
press the evidence obtained as a result of the use of the GPS
tracking device arguing it constituted a search and seizure
under the Fourth Amendment.'62 The court denied his motion,
and the defendant was convicted of manufacturing
methamphetamine and other crimes related thereto. 63 On ap-
peal, the Seventh Circuit found that the use of the GPS device
was neither a search nor a seizure under the Fourth Amend-
ment. 64 The court rejected the argument that the use of the
device was a seizure by pointing out that the device did not in-
terfere with the operation of the car.'65
More pertinent is the court's reasoning in determining that
the GPS tracking device does not constitute a search.1 66 The
court pointed out that the GPS tracking device used in this case
was available to the general public and cost only "a couple of
hundred dollars."' 67 The court compared the use of the GPS
156 Id. at 463.
157 Id. at 464 ("The question is not whether you or I must draw the blinds
before we commit a crime. It is whether you and I must discipline ourselves to
draw the blinds every time we enter a room, under pain of surveillance if we do
not.").
158 Id.
159 United States v. Garcia, 474 F.3d 994, 995 (7th Cir. 2007).
160 Id.
161 Id.
162 Id. at 996.
163 Id.
164 Id. at 997-98.
165 Id. at 996 ("The device ... did not draw power from the car's engine or
battery, did not take up room that might otherwise have been occupied by pas-
sengers or packages, did not even alter the car's appearance, and in short did not
'seize' the car in any intelligible sense of the word.").
166 Id. at 996-98.
167 Id. at 995.
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device to the use of a beeper, which the Supreme Court held in
United States v. Knotts,168 was not a search under the Fourth
Amendment. 169 In Knotts, the beeper was attached to a car for
the same reason as the GPS tracking device: to trace the trail of
the car without actually having to physically follow it.170 The
court even likened the GPS tracking device to observation of a
car via satellite imaging.'71 This, it contended, would not be a
search just as tracking the car using "cameras mounted on lamp-
posts" would not be a search. 7 2 The court found that the only
important distinction between the beeper tracking device and
the GPS tracking device was that one constituted old technology
and one constituted new technology. 17 3 In effect, the GPS track-
ing device is the exact same as following the defendant's truck
in a car, it just saves the police force time and money.'74
The court makes an important distinction between the use of
technology to substitute for an activity that is a search under the
Fourth Amendment and the use of technology to substitute for
an activity that is not a search.'75 The opinion pointed out that
Kyllo was a case involving a technological substitute for an activ-
ity that constituted a search; whereas, the use of a tracking de-
vice was a substitute for "following a car on a public street."'7 6
The court elaborated that the efficiency of the police can be
enhanced in this way without a subsequent loss of privacy
rights.'
Finally, the court declined to address the defendant's "mass
surveillance" argument. 78  The defendant argued that GPS
tracking devices should constitute a search because the police
could not install a GPS tracking device in all cars. 179 But the
168 460 U.S. 276 (1983).
169 Garcia, 474 F.3d at 996-97.
170 Id.
171 Id. at 997.
172 Id.
173 Id.
174 See id. at 998.
175 Id. at 997-98.
176 Id. at 997.
177 Id. at 998. The court comes to its conclusion, despite recognizing earlier in
the opinion that the advancement of technology used in the area of law enforce-
ment "impose[s] a heavier responsibility on this Court in its supervision of the
fairness of procedures in the federal court system." Id. (quoting Lopez v. United
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court stated it would not address that issue until after law en-
forcement officials actually engaged in mass surveillance.180
IV. IMPLICATIONS OF CURRENT SUPREME COURT
CASE LAW FOR THE NATIONAL APPLICATIONS OFFICE
If the National Applications Office is actually launched, Con-
gress is likely to demand that the Office carefully safeguard the
use of the information from satellite reconnaissance that it dis-
seminates to federal and local law enforcement officials. 81 The
recent case law has varying implications as to what those safe-
guards should be. Even cases that find observations from navi-
gable airspace constitutional limit the legality of the
observations in situations that are likely to apply to satellite
observations.
The first question that must be addressed is whether satellite
observation by law enforcement officials is allowed, and if so, to
what degree. The second question is how the National Applica-
tions Office can protect American citizens' Fourth Amendment
right to privacy from being encroached upon by granting access
to satellite-captured information to federal and local law en-
forcement agencies.
To apply the previously discussed case law to the use of spy
satellite reconnaissance, it is important to consider the differ-
ences between the images produced by aerial surveillance and
those produced by spy satellites. The investigating officer from
the sheriff's office used his "naked eye" to view the contents of
the greenhouse in Riley.18 2 Similarly, in Ciraolo, the police of-
ficer used a standard 35mm camera to take pictures of the de-
fendant's backyard. 3 In contrast, the EPA official in Dow used
a "sophisticated aerial mapping camera" to take pictures of
Dow's manufacturing facilities. 84 Not only did the EPA official
take seventy-five photographs,1 85 but the photographs were also
taken in "precise and rapid succession" so as to allow depth per-
ception in the pictures.1 8 6 In comparison, spy satellite recon-
naissance only had a precision of one meter in the 1960s and
197 0s, but now it is generally known that spy satellite reconnais-
180 Id.
181 U.S. Postpones Domestic Spy Satellite Program, supra note 2, at A21.
182 Florida v. Riley, 488 U.S. 445, 448 (1989).
183 California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 209 (1986).
184 Dow Chem. Co. v. United States, 476 U.S. 227, 242-43 (1986).
185 Id.
186 Id. at 243.
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sance has improved "down to a few inches. ' 187 Because of the
precision of U.S. spy satellite imagery, it has been said that
"[e]very square inch of Soviet territory was opened to American
eyes.188
Are satellite photos similar to photos taken from airplanes or
helicopters and therefore constitutional? It is clear from three
Supreme Court cases that if something can be observed from
navigable airspace, it is not sufficiently private so as to invoke
Fourth Amendment protections."8 So, what is navigable air
space and is space travel included within this definition? The
Court's emphasis in Ciraolo that the marijuana could be viewed
with the naked eye indicates that observation from space might
not fall within the reach of Ciraolo. Marijuana and other objects
cannot be seen from space with a "naked eye." But it is possible
that the Supreme Court might take a broader reading of Ciraolo
when dealing with the question of satellite observation, espe-
cially since satellite data can be obtained by the general public
from websites such as Google. 190 Whether or not the satellite
data dispensed through the National Applications Office is sub-
ject to Fourth Amendment protection may depend on how simi-
lar the data is to the satellite data already in the hands of the
public. An argument could be made that images of a civilian's
backyard obtained via satellite are not a "search" within the
Fourth Amendment because that person "knowingly exposed"
himself to satellite observation by conducting activity in his back-
yard. Since satellite data is accessible to every internet user, a
person has no reasonable expectation of privacy in his backyard.
Because the court refused to discuss the constitutionality of
the actual photograph in Ciraolo, it leaves unanswered the ques-
tion of whether or not the photograph itself was constitutional.
It is possible that the Court might find such a photograph un-
constitutional. If this is the case, perhaps satellite data images
will fall into the same category as photos taken from an airplane
and therefore be considered an unconstitutional search. It is
likely that the Court will eventually have to address this ques-
tion, especially if the National Applications Office law enforce-
187 THOMAS GRAHAM, JR. & KEITH A. HANSEN, SPY SATELLITES AND OTHER INTEL-
LIGENCE TECHNOLOGIES THAT CHANGED HISTORY 38 (2007).
188 Id. at 39.
189 Florida v. Riley, 488 U.S. 445, 445 (1989); Dow, 476 U.S. at 227; California v.
Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 207 (1986).
190 Michael Upchurch, How Technology-and Acronyms-Changed History, SEAT-
TLE TIMES, Jan. 11, 2008, at 142.
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ment domain starts providing its proposed services. In the case
of satellite photography, the photo itself would have to support
the warrant since there would be no actual observation possible.
The Court has already limited the Fourth Amendment to
such a degree that it can no longer be argued that property ob-
servable from space or an aerial view is subject to a reasonable
expectation of privacy. The "open fields" doctrine makes areas
that are neither "fields" nor "open" outside the reach of Fourth
Amendment protections.19 ' The Court allowed additional en-
croachment on privacy rights in Dow by finding areas that lack
the elements of both "open fields" and curtilage are not pro-
tected by the Fourth Amendment. 192 And, the Court has re-
stricted the curtilage doctrine so that areas immediately
adjacent to a private residence escape the reach of Fourth
Amendment protections.'93 The Riley case was the final straw in
this line of cases. After this case, any activity observable from
space was not subject to the Fourth Amendment.194 However,
the Court finally drew the line at the entrance and walls of a
house in Kyllo.195 The combination of these three cases leaves
the door open such that any observation capable of being made
without penetrating through walls-keeping in mind that obser-
vations made through translucent roofing panels do not fall
within the category of "walls"196 -are not "searches" within the
meaning of the Fourth Amendment. Unless Congress creates
strict guidelines to direct the use of satellite imagery, it is possi-
ble that anything exposed to satellite view would no longer be
reasonably private.
Although arguments can be made based on Dow that images
procured by satellite are not "searches," there are also argu-
ments that can be made from this case that restrict the use of
satellite data in the law enforcement arena. For example, the
fact that the Court relies heavily on the wide availability of the
camera used'9 7 could be applied to make an argument that sat-
ellite imagery is created using technology not widely available to
the public. The converse of the argument is that the satellite
technology is generally available on the internet. Again, this ar-
191 Dow, 476 U.S. at 231.
192 Id. at 236-38.
193 Ciraolo, 476 U.S. at 207.
194 Riley, 488 U.S. at 445.
195 Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 40 (2001).
196 Riley, 488 U.S. at 448.
197 Dow, 476 U.S. at 234.
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gument depends on the similarity between satellite data on the
internet and satellite data available through the National Appli-
cations Office.
It is possible that the Court will group satellite imagery availa-
ble through the National Applications Office with the aerial
photos taken in Dow based on its relatively weak resolution capa-
bilities. In fact, the mapping camera used in Dow could distin-
guish widths as low as half of an inch, whereas the satellite
imagery may only have a resolution of six inches. 198 So, it is
plausible, although unlikely, that the courts will allow satellite
imagery data to be used in place of the "aerial photography"
currently available to law enforcement agencies. In fact, the use
of such imagery would likely decrease the cost of gathering the
same data available by using an airplane or helicopter.'99
What about the line that the Court tries to draw at "intimate
details" in Dow?2"' Since satellite imagery might only be capable
of six-inch resolution, does it capture "intimate details" that
would require officers to obtain warrants prior to obtaining the
images? It is likely, based on the footnote in Dow, that satellite
images will not be considered searches based upon their resolu-
tion capabilities because they do not provide law enforcement
with the ability to read documents or discern faces.2"1
An even narrower reading of the Fourth Amendment is pro-
vided by the Court in Riley because, using its "public vantage
point" test, privacy rights are nonexistent as long as whatever
being observed is viewed from a place available to the public.2 °2
Does this include outer space? Quite possibly. Since the public
has access to satellite imagery, it could be argued that a satellite
is one of the public's vantage points. Or does the court limit the
public's "vantage point" to airspace carved out by FAA regula-
tions? After all, the Court specifically said that its decision
might be different if the helicopter was not flying within naviga-
ble airspace.20 3 It may not be possible to answer these questions
without further rulings from the Supreme Court, especially in
light of the fact that the plurality and concurrence in the Riley
198 Id. at 238; Rendleman, supra note 19, at 5.
199 Ross Kerber, Privacy: When is a Satellite Photo an Unreasonable Search?, WALL
ST. J., Jan. 27, 1998, at B.
200 Dow, 476 U.S. at 238.
201 See id. at 238 n.5; Rendleman, supra note 19, at 5.
202 Florida v. Riley, 488 U.S. 445, 449 (1989) (quoting California v. Ciraolo, 476
U.S. 207, 213 (1986)).
203 Id. at 451.
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case disagreed with respect to their definitions of airspace that
can be classified as a "public vantage point. 20 4
Three questions can be asked to determine whether or not
surveillance is a "search" within the meaning of the Fourth
Amendment: 1) Was the surveillance of a kind that is sufficiently
rare? 2) Does the surveillance interfere with the normal use of
the curtilage? or 3) Does the surveillance reveal intimate de-
tails? 20 5 An affirmative answer to any of these questions may
cause the questioned surveillance to be deemed unconstitu-
tional in the absence of a warrant. Therefore, it is important to
determine the answers to these questions regarding the type of
satellite surveillance data that will be put in the hands of law
enforcement officials as a result of the National Applications Of-
fice program.
Today, satellite observation has become quite common, espe-
cially since it has been used in mapping programs widely availa-
ble on the internet. Perhaps the type of observation available
via Measurement and Signatures Intelligence ("MASINT"), dif-
fers significantly from the kind of information currently availa-
ble to civilian agencies. 20 6 But if the data available via MASINT
is sufficiently similar to the data already widely available, the
Court may find that a search by law enforcement using this tech-
nology does not require a warrant. One difference between
MASINT and current civilian satellite technology is that
MASINT can see through material that other technologies can-
not.20 7 This, of course, brings up questions regarding how
much data will be given to law enforcement officials. For exam-
ple, if local law enforcement asks for images of a person's backy-
ard in order to determine if illegal activity is being conduct
therein, is the National Applications Office required to edit
parts of the photo that contain images of objects within the
home?20 And if the National Applications Office is charged
204 Id.
205 Id. at 451-52 (Flying a helicopter at 400 feet is not rare, does not interfere
with normal use of curtilage, and does not reveal intimate details.).
206 Block, supra note 15 ("MASINT ... [is] a particular kind of information
collected by spy satellites which would for the first time become available to civil
agencies.").
207 Id.
208 Note that the question would not be whether the National Applications
Office would have to delete objects visible within the "curtilage" because there
are parts of the curtilage-namely, those outside of the house-that are subject
to observation by the government without requiring probable cause. See Califor-
nia v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 207 (1986).
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with the duty of removing the data regarding such objects,
would that be sufficient to keep the satellite data from being a
"search?"
So, in order to answer the second question, it might be neces-
sary for the Court to elaborate on the meaning of "interfere."
Taking a satellite picture does not physically interfere with activ-
ity, but since Katz, the Court has retreated from focusing on the
physical aspect of "searches. '2°9 Therefore, it is possible that sat-
ellite observation can interfere with activity inside a home in the
sense that certain activities might be curtailed because of the
awareness that they can be observed at all times. The answer to
whether or not satellite observation interferes with activity inside
the curtilage depends on exactly what the spy satellite data can
observe and in what detail. Since it appears that the data com-
piled by MASINT can be collected through concrete, it is likely
that it can see through rooftops as well. 210 This has serious im-
plications for what could become of the "reasonable expectation
of privacy" test espoused by Katz, because it opens the door to
surveillance of virtually every activity that takes place indoors or
outdoors.
Finally, the result of the "intimate details" test pulled from
Justice O'Connor's concurrence in Riley hinges on whether or
not a resolution of six inches qualifies as "intimate detail." Since
the dimensions of the images resolved were smaller than six in-
ches in Dow and the Court still upheld the observation as consti-
tutional, it is likely that the Court will turn its attention away
from actual measurements and instead focus on what activities
can actually be ascertained and whether or not these activities
are "intimate." In fact, this appears to be the direction the
Court took in Kyllo when it pointed out that a thermal-imaging
device could be used to discern whether or not the lady of the
house was taking her bath.211 If this is the line of reasoning that
the Court applies, satellite imaging should be severely restricted
if not kept entirely out of the hands of law enforcement
agencies.
Justice O'Connor disagreed with the plurality opinion with re-
spect to what test should be used to determine whether a person
has a legitimate right to privacy from aerial observation. Since
209 Krysten C. Kelly, Note, Warrantless Satellite Surveillance: Will Our 4th Amend-
ment Privacy Rights Be Lost in Space?, 13J. MARSHALL J. COMPUTER & INFO. L. 729,
734 (1995).
210 See Block, supra note 15.
211 Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 38 (2001).
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Justice O'Connor would draw the line at where the public trav-
els with frequency, as opposed to where air travel is permitted by
the FAA, the plurality's test would be greatly undermined. In
fact, at this time there really is no firm test to determine exactly
what people should reasonably expect as far as observation from
the skies. In the future, the Court will probably be forced to
choose between the two tests since each has varying implications
for the use of technological advances. It is possible that satellite
observation would be rejected on both grounds because the
public does not generally traverse through space nor is outer
space within FAA regulations. Since it is highly unlikely that
such a literal reading will be given to both of the opinions, it is
useful to consider the arguments that can be made for satellite
technology under each of the differing theories.
On one hand, Justice O'Connor's theory that people cannot
reasonably expect privacy from airspace frequented by the pub-
lic might lead one to conclude that people cannot reasonably
expect freedom from satellite observation, because satellite ob-
servation is in the hands of the general public.2"2 In fact,
O'Connor's concurrence in Riley, combined with the majority's
decision in Dow, creates a strong argument for the use of spy
satellite data by law enforcement officials. 21 The airplane used
to take pictures in Dow traveled within publicly frequented air-
space, which O'Connor would suggest, removes any reasonable
expectation of privacy.214 In addition, the camera used in Dow
was more powerful and technologically advanced than cameras
owned by the general public, just as the spy satellite data will
have a higher resolution and be more technologically advanced
than the satellite imagery that is currently in the hands of the
public.21 5 On the other hand, it could be argued that under
Justice O'Connor's theory, satellite imagery data is a "search"
because the public generally does not have access to satellite
data. This, however, is a difficult argument to make in light of
the prominence of satellite imagery on the internet.216
The Supreme Court decision in Kyllo went in a different direc-
tion than the three cases addressing aerial surveillance and the
Fourth Amendment. The Court's focus on the fact that they
were observing things inside the home gives some guidance to
212 See Florida v. Riley, 488 U.S. 445, 454-55 (1989) (O'Connor, J., concurring).
213 See id. at 452-55.
214 See id. at 454.
215 See Block, supra note 15; Magnuson & Wagner, supra note 29.
216 Upchurch, supra note 190, at 142.
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the executive branch as to the constitutional limits on law en-
forcement observation techniques. This clearly places a limit on
the use of surveillance techniques, such as satellite data collec-
tion, that can see through concrete and roofing. In light of
Kyllo, the National Applications Office should be required to re-
strict images given to law enforcement agents. The images
should be limited to areas that are already exposed to public
view. It is interesting to recall that the Court in Riley permitted
photos to be taken of areas partially covered by a roof. This
probably opens up the use of satellite images taken of areas not
completely covered as long as they are not pictures of the home.
The Court's emphasis on the reasonableness of an expecta-
tion of privacy within the home indicates that it is not willing to
completely dissolve privacy rights, even as technology advances
by putting strong tools in the hands of law enforcement officials.
The Court again relies on the fact that intimate details should
not be subject to observation absent a warrant. 21v Since the
Court considers details obtained using a thermal imaging device
to be "intimate" and protected by the Fourth Amendment, it is
likely that the Court will not allow satellite images of the inside
of homes to be taken and used without a search warrant. So, it
is unlikely that law enforcement agencies will be able to shortcut
obtaining a warrant to search within one's home.
There is an argument to be made that the Court's decision in
Kyllo will not restrict the use of satellite data because the fact
that the thermal imaging device was not available to the general
public was determinative. Since satellite data is already available
to the public and law enforcement officials-as mentioned by
the Seventh Circuit in Garcia2l-the use of satellite data may
not constitute a "search."
The material problem with trying to launch a program such as
the National Applications Office is that the law is unsettled as to
how law enforcement officials will be able to use advanced tech-
nology. In fact, the Court has specifically postponed deciding
this question.219 Therefore, there are arguments either way
based upon Kyllo, and none of them are more likely than the
others. Since the Court has refused to determine how far it is
going to let technology erode the protections of the Fourth
217 Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 38-39 (2001).
218 United States v. Garcia, 474 F.3d 994, 997 (7th Cir. 2007).
219 Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 33.
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Amendment, it is impossible to use the Kyllo case to set bounda-
ries for this new program.
It is important to note that the Court in Kyllo reiterated the
importance that the subject matter under observation be uncov-
ered and available to "public" view.20 Unfortunately for those
who value their privacy, if the Court continues to follow its the-
ory laid out in Kyllo--that limitations on privacy are inevitable in
a world of ever-advancing technology-it will probably deter-
mine that satellite surveillance is simply an unstoppable con-
straint on our constitutional right to privacy.22' In other words,
if the public has access to satellite technology, then anything
viewable through these means is rendered not reasonably pri-
vate. For those who are worried about encroachments on their
privacy, they can rest their hopes on the declared purpose of the
Court not to "leave the homeowner at the mercy of advancing
technology-including imaging technology that could discern
all human activity in the home. ' 222 The majority in Kyllo seems
to be steering the Fourth Amendment reasonable search juris-
prudence in a different direction than Dow, Ciraolo, and Riley.223
It is possible that the Court could halt the erosion of the Fourth
Amendment altogether.
The Seventh Circuit case involving GPS tracking devices has
dangerous implications for the constitutionality of satellite data
in the hands of law enforcement officials. If other courts choose
to follow the Seventh Circuits' lines of reasoning, there will be
very little left of the Fourth Amendment to salvage. The major-
ity in Garcia made its decision that the use of GPS tracking de-
vices is constitutionally based, at least in part, on its availability
to the general public and its low cost.224 Since satellite data is in
0the hands of many and the cost is almost free, perhaps this will
be one easy way for the government to justify searches using sat-
ellite images.
The court even brings up the use of satellite data in describ-
ing a type of surveillance that would not constitute a search
under the Fourth Amendment. It brushes aside all argument to
the contrary by suggesting that satellite images are just like pic-
220 See id. at 33-34.
221 See id. ("It would be foolish to contend that the degree of privacy secured to
citizens by the Fourth Amendment has been entirely unaffected by the advance
of technology.").
222 Id. at 35-36.
223 See id. at 33-34.
224 United States v. Garcia, 474 F.3d 994, 995 (7th Cir. 2007).
434
NATIONAL APPLICATIONS OFFICE
tures taken from "cameras mounted on lampposts. "225 Perhaps
the court fails to see the distinction between "cameras mounted
on lampposts" and satellites orbiting the earth. It seems all too
obvious. Cameras mounted in a particular place take pictures of
a particular location. Satellites, however, are in constant motion
and have the capability to take pictures of anything and
everything.
The reason that GPS is so relevant to the discussion of making
spy satellite reconnaissance available to law enforcement is be-
cause both types of information are available using satellite tech-
nology. 226 The Seventh Circuit even points out the similarities:
"[i] nstead of transmitting images, the satellite transmitted geo-
physical coordinates. 22 7 If courts are willing to hold that the
use of GPS tracking devices does not constitute a search under
the Fourth Amendment, it is very likely, because of the similari-
ties, that they will come to the same conclusion with respect to
satellite imagery.228 Further, the difference between GPS track-
ing and satellite images does not appear to cause any constitu-
tional problems. As the court in Garcia points out "[t]he only
difference is that in the imaging case nothing touches the vehi-
cle, while in the case at hand the tracking device does. 229 If
anything, this difference between the two technologies makes it
more likely that satellite imaging will not be considered a search
since it causes no physical intrusion at all. 3°
The circuit court asserted that new technology should not be
deemed unconstitutional merely because it is new.231 The Sev-
enth Circuit articulated a view that is quite open to allowing new
technologies to be used by the government. 232 In fact, the court
applied the policy of enhancing law enforcement abilities at a
low cost.233 This low price, however, seems to come at a cost of
Fourth Amendment privacy rights. The court, however, did not
declare that all new advances in technology should be blindly
embraced.234 Instead, the court argued that the distinction be-








233 Id. at 998 ("These 'fantastic advances' continue, and are giving the police
access to surveillance techniques that are ever cheaper and ever more effective.").
234 Id. at 997-98.
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tween what is constitutional and what is not should remain, and
the new technologies should be compared with old technologies
to determine whether they fall inside or outside constitutional
limits. 23 5 In light of this theory, law enforcement agencies' use
of satellite imagery will be allowed as long as it is similar to the
way other technologies are already employed.236 This line be-
tween constitutional observation and unconstitutional searches
is such a blurry one that it is difficult to predict which side of the
line satellite images fall. It is possible that where it lands might
depend on the images themselves rather than the technology as
a whole.
The Seventh Circuit's conclusion regarding "mass surveil-
lance '2 7 is hazardous to the protections of the Fourth Amend-
ment. If courts continue to wait to address the possibility of
mass surveillance, it may be too late. The idea of numerous GPS
tracking devices being used to track all car movement is less
likely than the idea of monitoring all activity using spy satellites.
If the government were going to use GPS tracking to conduct
"mass surveillance," it would have to purchase all of the new
technology and install it in every vehicle. On the other hand,
spy satellite technology is probably already sufficient to conduct
mass surveillance at no additional cost and with no installation
required. This is a situation the courts will be forced to face,
and it would be safer for our privacy rights if they would address
it sooner rather than later.
V. CONCLUSION
If the Department of Homeland Security hopes to successfully
launch the National Applications Office, it must give serious at-
tention to the repercussions that the law enforcement domain
may have on Americans' privacy rights and expectations. It is
commendable that the Department of Homeland Security ac-
knowledges that oversight is necessary, but so far its oversight
plans involve the officials who have general supervision over the
Department itself. Furthermore, the Department has yet to re-
veal the specific lengths that it will go to safeguard constitutional
rights; for example, once a law enforcement officer completes a
PUM, how will the National Applications Office evaluate the
form? What "needs" will be sufficient to obtain spy data from
235 Id.
2- See id. at 996-98.
237 Id. at 998.
436
NATIONAL APPLICATIONS OFFICE
the Office? Where should recipients be required to store the
data obtained from the Office, and how will the Office ensure
that such storage takes place? It remains to be seen whether the
Department will actually develop a feasible plan for protecting
constitutional rights that could be infringed more easily by law
enforcement officials with access to spy satellite reconnaissance.
The major barrier to the ability of the Department of Home-
land Security to construct a plan for safeguarding Fourth
Amendment protections is the uncertainty as to the constitu-
tionality of the use of satellite reconnaissance by law enforce-
ment agencies. It will probably be necessary for the Department
to implement a regulatory plan and launch the National Appli-
cations Office before the Court will clarify the scope of the
Fourth Amendment with respect to satellite data. If this is the
case, the Department should err on the side of caution when
composing a regulatory procedure for the dissemination of spy
satellite data.
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